Regulatory State and Judicial Decisions in Telecommunications in Mexico by Alvarez, Clara Luz
Regulatory State and judicial decisions in telecommunications in Mexico (p. 15-36) 15 
 
ALVAREZ, C. L. Regulatory State and Judicial Decisions in Telecommunications in Mexico. The Law, State 
and Telecommunications Review, Brasilia, v. 10, n. 1, p. 15-36, May 2018. [DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.26512/lstr.v10i1.21498] 
 
Regulatory State and Judicial Decisions in Telecommunications in 
Mexico  
 
Submitted: 15/02/2018 
Clara Luz Alvarez* Revised: 13/03/2018 
Accepted: 14/03/2018 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – To assess the role of the judiciary in defining the Regulatory State and in 
regulating telecommunications in Mexico after almost 5 years of the creation of an 
independent regulator for telecommunications and broadcasting (Instituto Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones) with authority in antitrust matters.  
Methodology/approach/design – To identify the most relevant judicial decisions in 
telecommunications and antitrust matters, research upon the context in which they were 
adopted, analyze the content of the decisions and identify the impact of such judicial 
decisions in the construction of the Mexican Regulatory State, and in the law, in 
regulation/acts of the regulator. 
Findings – The main findings are that: (1) the Mexican Regulatory State is a reality 
now, even if it is in its beginnings; (2) Congress is receptive to Judiciary´s decisions; and 
(3) deference by judiciary to the regulator is not a blank check, even if there are complex 
technical issues and a discretionary decision. 
Practical implications – The identification of a Regulatory State in Mexico evidences 
that there are deep changes in the traditional relationship between Congress and 
regulators. Also, the deference granted by the courts to regulators must be considered as a 
consequence of such Regulatory State. Nonetheless and despite the deference to 
regulators, Judiciary´s role in building the telecommunications and broadcasting sector is 
paramount, because judicial decisions ultimately define it.  
Originality/value – Major changes to telecommunications and broadcasting have taken 
place in Mexico in the last years. Therefore, there has been scarce research and analysis 
about the new role of regulators, legislators, and judges, in the so called Regulatory State 
in Mexico. Moreover, the experience of Mexico may be valuable for other scholars which 
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are assessing public policy in their own Latin American countries or in countries with 
similarities to them.  
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Introduction 
The Regulatory State concept has entered to the legal and regulatory 
debates in Mexico, via judicial decisions of telecommunication cases. Also, the 
Mexican Supreme Court and the specialized courts in telecommunications, 
broadcasting and antitrust have been setting the last point in regulation since the 
Constitution was amended in such matters and the independent regulator was 
created in 2013.  
This article reviews the most significant cases in telecommunications 
decided by the judiciary in Mexico, assessing the role that the judiciary has had 
to start defining the Regulatory State and the impact of such decisions in the 
Mexican legal framework. This is important because in telecommunications 
there is much more literature and research done regarding the regulators than 
upon the judiciary, yet the judiciary has one of the most significant participation 
in shaping telecommunications and broadcasting.  
The background of telecommunications and broadcast is presented in 
Part I, referring to the emergence of such services in last century under the 
natural monopoly concept and passing to the privatization and liberalization of 
telecommunications markets in the 1990s. Then, it describes the creation of the 
first telecommunication regulator in Mexico with the main challenges it faced, 
which contributed to justify the Constitution´s amendment in 2013 and the 
creation of a new regulator (the Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones or IFT) 
and of courts specialized in telecommunications, broadcasting and antitrust 
matters (hereinafter referred as Specialized Courts).  
Part II starts with the acknowledgement that there is no unique concept of 
a Regulatory State, to continue with the analysis of the Mexican Supreme 
Court´s decision that is the milestone for the construction of the Mexican 
concept of Regulatory State, as well as for the relationship between law and 
regulation. The Zero Tariff case is then studied due to its implications of the 
scope of authority of the regulator within the framework of the Regulatory State.  
Part III expounds a case brought by an indigenous poet and journalist 
against the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law which was decided by 
the Supreme Court. Although the case had no obligation whatsoever upon 
Congress, it decided to amend the law in order to comply with the Court´s 
interpretation. 
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The Specialized Courts have set criteria in connection to the deference 
granted to the regulator, which will be explained in Part IV. Then two cases in 
which the IFT´s decisions were overturned despite such deference, will be 
analyzed. Finally, the conclusions of the research and analysis will be presented. 
Background 
Telecommunications developed during most part of the XXth Century 
under the natural monopoly concept which promotes having only one enterprise 
providing the service in order to benefit from economies of scale and to help 
reduce the costs of the services to the public. Pursuant to the natural monopoly, 
the monopoly could be public or private, local, regional or nationwide. 
Normally, there was a ministry as the authority with faculties to rule upon 
telecommunications, to overview the public or private monopoly, and to decide 
on public policy regarding telecommunications (e.g. universal access to 
telecommunication services). 
Mexico was by no means the exception to the above. The natural 
monopoly was the rationale underlying the licenses granted to provide 
telecommunication services pursuant to the law (Ley de Vías Generales de 
Comunicaciones of 1940), and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes 
(Ministry of Communications) was the authority. In telephony a private 
monopoly was turned to a public enterprise in the 1970s, and back to a private 
monopoly in 1990 (Alvarez, 2013). Cable TV licenses were granted by cities or 
limited geographic areas, but no additional license was granted in the same city 
or area, hence there were regional monopolies in this service (Alvarez 2013). 
Free-to-air TV channels were limited. By early 1990 as there was a major 
national commercial TV broadcaster (Televisa) and a couple of public channels, 
one of which was privatized in 1993 to a corporate group (TV Azteca) (Alvarez, 
2015a).  
The 1990s started with major privatizations as the public telephone 
company, Telmex, as well as with the execution of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and several agreements within the World Trade 
Organization (Alvarez, 2018). Mexico enacted a pro-competition 
telecommunications law in 1995 and created a regulator with authority in 
telecommunications but not in broadcasting nor did it had any authority on 
antitrust matters (Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones, Cofetel). Cofetel 
was an administrative body of the Ministry of Communications, with limited 
authority (e.g. Cofetel had no authority to sanction, nor to grant licenses) and its 
staff was insufficient (Alvarez, 2013). 
Challenges against Cofetel's decisions were constant and injunctions to 
prevent enforcement of them during lengthy trials was an everyday matter. For 
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example, an interconnection dispute resolution issued by Cofetel could be 
initially challenged before the Ministry of Communications (recurso de 
revisión), then an annulment lawsuit (demanda de juicio de nulidad) could be 
filed before an administrative tribunal (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y 
Administrativa), and against the final decision of it, an amparo lawsuit could be 
brought before the Federal Judiciary courthouses. Neither the administrative 
tribunal nor the Federal Judiciary had any specialization in telecommunications, 
broadcasting or antitrust. Moreover, injunctions against Cofetel's dispute 
resolution could be granted. The litigation time could be over 3 or 4 years. 
Additionally, the same acts could generate different litigation strategies, 
diverse moments to file the lawsuits, against different authorities and acts which 
could be real acts or invented ones (Roldán, 2014). The injunction (suspensión) 
against the acts turned out to be the main objective of a good part of the 
litigation strategies (Roldán, 2014). The lawsuits before the creation of the 
Specialized Courts in 2013, could be brought in several cities creating 
sometimes contradictory results in the same matters (Roldán, 2014). 
“the current legal system plus the frequent use of the amparo, is the principal 
factor that prevents the application of regulation in Mexico. Consequently, 
(…) [Cofetel] is a regulatory entity incapable of regulating” (OCDE, 2012: 
133) [Translation by author]. 
In 2013, a major amendment to the Mexican Constitution in 
telecommunication and antitrust took place, whereby –inter alia-, (1) a new 
regulator was created, the IFT, (2) the only legal remedy against acts, omissions 
and norms by the IFT would be the amparo indirecto, (3) no injunction 
(suspension) will be granted, and (4) the creation of specialized courts in 
telecommunications and antitrust matters was ordered. 
IFT 
“one institutional feature that commonly emerges [within regulatory states] is 
the independent regulatory agency. Its popularity is often explained by its 
capacity to combine professionalism, operational autonomy, political 
insulation, flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, and policy expertise 
in highly complex spheres of activity.” (Yeung, 2010: section 4.5). 
The IFT was established in the Mexican Constitution with the greatest 
autonomy that the Mexican State grants to a public entity. The IFT is 
independent of the traditional federal Executive, Legislative and Judiciary 
branches, and it is at the same level of them.  
There are constitutional objectives for the IFT to pursue in 
telecommunications and broadcasting: their efficient development, competition 
and free market, as well as guaranteeing certain human rights (freedom of 
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expression, right to information). The IFT is also the antitrust regulator for 
telecommunication and broadcasting.  
Only amparo, no injunction 
Any person that deems that an act, an omission or a norm (regulation) 
issued by the IFT infringes his/her rights, may only challenge it via a judicial 
review known as juicio de amparo or simply amparo. The amparo is a federal 
judicial proceeding for the protection and remedy of human rights and of 
constitutional rights infringement. The amparo will include not only IFT´s act, 
omission or norm, but also any claim against due process, against acts 
performed during a proceeding, and against any law deemed unconstitutional. 
No injunction will be granted whatsoever.  
Specialized courts 
The Specialized Courts were created. There are two lower and two upper 
Specialized Courts with jurisdiction for all the Mexican Republic, and with 
domicile in Mexico City.  
“This not only ameliorates the workload of other judicial institutions, but it 
also guarantees that the decisions are taken by public servants with enough 
background in these subjects [telecommunications, broadcasting and antitrust] 
which involve highly complex and technical issues, which in turn stimulates a 
better efficiency in all the judiciary and it increases the strength of judicial 
decisions”. (OCDE, 2017: 31) [Translation by author]. 
It is important to note that certain telecommunication and antitrust 
matters may be decided by the Mexican Supreme Court. It will review amparos 
that challenge the constitutionality of a law, and those amparos with novel issues 
that pose significant impact. Also, it will decide upon disputes between public 
entities that challenge the scope of authority of the IFT or vice versa 
(controversia constitucional). 
Whether the Specialized Courts or the Supreme Court, Roldán recalls 
Basú in their role: 
“The institutional function of impartiality and objectivity do not exclude ways 
of thinking, ideologies, theoretical options, judges´ emotions as human beings. 
Access to justice also has implicit the right to a human decision. (…) The 
experience indicates that the tribunals have been relevant actors in regulating 
the market and in the social regulation. When deciding disputes [judges] 
specify rights, obligations, restrictions, guides; or, institutional functions of the 
legislative, of the Public Administration, of the regulators. (Roldán, 2018: 186) 
[Translation by author]. 
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Evolution towards a Regulatory State 
There is no unique concept of a Regulatory State but rather certain 
common features with its own characteristics and dynamics, such features 
include separation between policy-making and providing of services, an 
independent regulator, and a decrease of state control upon national economic 
indicators (Yeung, 2010).  
The Mexican Regulatory State emergence in the constitutional discourse 
appear in two telecommunication cases decided by the Supreme Court, which 
are explained in this section.  
“The [Mexican] Court's interpretation allows to appreciate the incorporation of 
the Regulatory State into the judicial speech. It sets forth the main 
characteristics: creation of norms in a sphere that is independent of political 
pressures (autonomy as an institutional warranty), and of the interests of the 
regulated [agents] (risks of capture) in order to advance market efficiency.” 
(Roldán, 2018: 162) [Translation by author]. 
Construction of the Mexican Regulatory State 
Although this case´s background is portability, its relevance is for the 
concept of Mexican Regulatory State, and the relationship between the law of 
Congress and the regulation by the regulator, the IFT.  
The Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law entered into force in 
August 13, 2014, ordering the IFT to issue -within 60 business days- rules which 
would enable number portability to be performed in 24 hours. The IFT approved 
such rules in that timeframe and published them a couple of days after (Instituto 
Federal de Telecomunicaciones, 2014). The portability rules would enter into 
force in 90 calendar days after being published, and the 24-hour term would be 
computed considering certain business hours/days1.  
The Senate considered that the IFT had invaded Congress´ scope of 
authority insofar as the IFT published the rules outside of the term given and it 
ignored the 24-hour term by establishing business hours/days for it to start 
computing. Therefore, the Senate argued that the IFT violated the separation of 
power principle (principio de division de poderes), the supremacy of the law 
principle and the principle that law has to rule over certain matters (principio de 
reserva de ley). 
The Mexican Court acknowledged that this case was a novel one, which 
evidenced a new type of constitutional engineering as both Congress and the IFT 
                                                          
1The 24 hours would start if the number portability request was presented before the 
telecom provider from Monday to Saturday from 11am to 5pm. If the request was filed 
outside such days/times, then the 24 hours would be computed since 11am of the next 
business day. 
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are created in the Constitution, so they have an equal standing, and both have 
express authority in the Constitution to issue norms in telecommunications and 
broadcasting which share the same characteristics: general, abstract and 
impersonal norms. In the case of Congress those norms are called laws, in the 
case of the IFT they are called general administrative provisions (disposiciones 
administrativas de carácter general) known also as regulation (regulación). 
The IFT was created to regulate in favor of an efficient 
telecommunications and broadcasting market, and also to advance in the 
enjoyment of human rights as freedom of expression and right to information, as 
the Supreme Court identified in the legislative intent for creating the IFT.  
“(…) the Regulatory State concept as a state design model created by the 
Permanent Constituent to address the specific requirements of postindustrial 
society (created by the complexity of market functioning), which confers 
authority to certain independent agencies – [independent] from the political 
bodies and from the regulated agentes - to issue regulation in certain 
specialized issues which are based in technical disciplines or rationales. This 
model of Regulatory State, by general rule, mandate the coexistence of two 
purposes: the existence of efficient markets, at the same time that achieving 
fair conditions enables the broadest enjoyment of all the human rights in the 
constitution”. (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2015) [Translation by 
author].  
The Court recognized that IFT has knowledge and capacity to issue 
regulation in technical matters whereas Congress has not the same expertise, and 
such regulation has to be frequently adapted to attain efficient markets when free 
market by itself cannot achieve it (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 
2015). Consequently, the IFT has authority to innovate through norms, provided 
they do not contradict the law (non-contradiction principle or principio de no 
contradicción). Moreover, if the law does not establish anything on certain issue 
in the realm of telecommunications and broadcasting and such issue is not 
expressly required by the Constitution to be in the law (reserva de ley), then the 
IFT can regulate freely (Alvarez, 2018). 
The Supreme Court not only ruled in favor of the IFT and gave deference 
to its decisions regarding portability, it also established a milestone for 
regulators in Mexico. The decision traces the departure of the traditional 
conception of public administration as part of the Executive branch and of the 
subordination of regulation to the law. Regulation by the Executive is 
subordinated to the law and must not exceed what the law says. However, as a 
constitutionally autonomous entity outside the Executive branch, the IFT2 may 
                                                          
2This would also be applicable to the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica 
(Cofece) insofar as the IFT and the Cofece were created at the same time, in the same 
article of the Constitution and with the same faculties. 
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issue regulation (norms) which can go furthermore from the law, as long as it 
does not contradict the law. 
For explanation purposes, please consider the following examples. 
Imagine the law says that a wall must be painted in red. If the regulation were to 
be from the Executive branch, then such regulation can only establish that the 
wall is painted with red color. If the regulation were to be from the IFT, then 
IFT´s regulation may decide to paint it red, with different tones of red, with a 
rainbow and flowers to make the wall more attractive. Does this IFT regulation 
contradicts what the law says? No, because the wall is in fact red, yet it goes 
further and includes other drawings in the wall. What would happen if the law 
said that the wall must only be painted in red? In this case the IFT could not 
include the rainbow and flowers, because it would contradict what the law 
mandates that the wall should only be painted in red. 
Regulator’s primary authority 
The amendment to the Constitution on telecommunications of 2013 
included the creation of the concept of preponderant agent. 
“[The preponderant agent] purports to identify economic agents with excessive 
market power and impose special obligations to cope with such power through 
a fast-track procedure. The IFT was mandated to determine those carriers in 
the telecom and the broadcast sectors that hold more than 50% of national 
participation in such services based on the number of users, audience, network 
traffic or capacity. (…) The determination of a preponderant agent by itself 
would not achieve any public interest objective, because knowing that an agent 
holds a certain market share does not correct market failures nor does it 
prevent abuse of market power. Consequently, the special obligations imposed 
to the preponderant are the instruments by virtue of which measures are 
established to prevent and deter any harm to competition.” (Alvarez, 2015b: 
16).  
The IFT determined on March 6, 2014, that América Móvil and members 
of its corporate group3 were preponderant agents in the telecommunications 
sector. It also established several special obligations as interconnection rates, 
including termination rates. On July 14, 2014, the Mexican Congress issued the 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law which includes article 131 
regarding traffic termination rates. This article states that the preponderant 
agents may not charge any termination rate to their competitors (known as Zero 
Tariff), whereas the preponderant´s competitors will charge termination rates to 
the preponderant.   
Telcel filed an amparo lawsuit against the Zero Tariff in article 131 
which was finally decided by the Supreme Court. Although the main topic of the 
                                                          
3The economic interest group of América Móvil was considered América Móvil, Telcel, 
Telmex, Telnor, Grupo Carso and Grupo Financiero Inbursa.  
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lawsuit was the Zero Tariff and whether it was a confiscatory measure or 
whether it could be considered a taking, the Supreme Court´s decision was 
based on IFT´s constitutional authority on regulatory matters. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the separation of power principle is 
evolutionary and that the checks and balances idea underlying it, continues to be 
valid. The autonomy of the IFT established in the Constitution is a mean to 
achieve its objectives, and its scope of authority is meant to guarantee several 
constitutional rights (e.g. freedom of expression, right to information, right to 
education) (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2017). 
So, as the Constitution itself grants authority to the IFT to determine 
preponderant agents, and to impose special obligations including 
interconnection rates, then Congress had invaded IFT´s scope of authority when 
it mandated in the law a Zero Tariff for preponderant agents. The Supreme 
Court ordered the IFT to decide upon the termination tariff for the preponderant 
agent in telecommunication (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2017). In 
compliance with the Supreme Court´s decision, the IFT determined an 
asymmetric tariff for termination between the preponderant agent and its 
competitors. 
The Supreme Court´s decision of this case is polemic for the effects of 
the judicial protection granted to Telcel, because it may not recover the 
termination rates from the past and the new rates started applying several 
months after the decision. However, this decision continues with the Regulatory 
State discourse by acknowledging the relevant position that the IFT as the 
telecommunication regulator has, and the existence of primary authority 
(competencia originaria) granted from the Constitution to the IFT. Such primary 
authority may not be disregarded by Congress.  
Judicial resolution, Congress action  
“By case law or binding precedents [jurisprudencia], the courts form an 
interpretative body which establishes the reference to appreciate the width and 
extent of the economic liberties or the forms of state intervention in the 
market” (Roldan, 2018) [Translation by author]. 
The Federal Judiciary may determine that a norm is unconstitutional 
either for a particular case when an amparo proceeding is followed and judicial 
protection is granted against such norm only to the person that filed the amparo, 
or when there is a general declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm.  
For a norm to receive a general declaration of unconstitutionality (1) 
there must be at least five cases in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was 
determined via amparo proceedings, (2) the authority that issued the norm was 
informed of such cases where the norm was found unconstitutional, (3) the 
issuing authority did not abrogate or change the norm deemed unconstitutional 
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within a 90 day term, and (4) the Supreme Court -by a majority of eight votes of 
the ministers- decides to issue the general declaration of unconstitutionality of 
the norm.  
Congress has in general been receptive to the Supreme Court´s decisions 
and arguments in telecommunication and antitrust, even if a provision of the law 
does not receive a general declaration of unconstitutionality. Under the new 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law there is one case in which Congress 
was not ordered to act by the Supreme Court, but it preferred to amend the law 
before new cases could be decided and Congress would have been obliged to 
act. The case involves broadcasting stations, indigenous people, and national 
languages as will be explained hereunder. 
Besides Spanish which is spoken by the majority of Mexicans, there are 
62 indigenous languages in the Mexican Republic which are mainly transmitted 
orally (Navarrete, 2008). It is estimated that 21.5% of the population of the 
Mexican Republic is indigenous based on their self-identification (Comisión 
Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2015). Indigenous people 
are distributed along the Mexican Republic either in specific locations, regions 
or in several states and cities (Navarrete, 2008). This is relevant when dealing 
with the use of distribution platforms (e.g. radio, free-to-air TV, pay TV), 
because in a city there may be people from different indigenous communities 
and with different languages. 
“(…) all the indigenous languages of Mexico share an unequal relationship 
with the dominant language in our country: Spanish. (…) All the laws are 
written in that language, the education was only in Spanish until very recently 
and all the government matters, and of the most rich and powerful segments of 
society, have been managed almost exclusively in Spanish. (…) In the last 
decade radio and television have granted more force to Spanish: the immense 
majority of the media in our country are monolingual and do not give any 
participation to the other languages spoken in Mexico.” (Navarrete, 2008: 75-
76) [Translation by author]. 
When the new Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law was enacted 
in 2014, article 230 mandated that broadcasting stations must transmit in the 
“national language” (idioma nacional), whereas the indigenous broadcasting 
stations may use their own language. Although there was no reference as to 
which was the “national language”, Spanish was understood to be the one.  
Mardonio Carballo a nahuatl4 poet and journalist filed an amparo lawsuit 
considering that such provision discriminated him, and restricted his freedom of 
expression and right to information, provided that the broadcast stations where 
he could express himself in his native language (nahuatl) were significantly 
                                                          
4 The nahuas are the most numerous indigenous people in the Mexican Republic.  
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reduced to only the indigenous stations; because he was denied his right to 
receive information in his native language, etcetera.  
The Mexican Supreme Court first of all acknowledged that the 
Constitution does not recognize any single language as the national one. Instead, 
the native languages were a material expression of the pluricultural nature of the 
Mexican Republic (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2016). 
“(...) the fact that several provisions state that different procedures must be 
performed in Spanish, does not make it the language of the [Mexican] Nation. 
The concept of official language must be distinguished from that of national 
language. The first one refers to the language normally used when government 
communications are issued. Instead of that, the national language represents 
the language in which a country has its identity and cultural roots. Hence, even 
though some procedures before the government are done in Spanish, this is not 
the only language of the Nation.” (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 
2016) [Translation by author]. 
Afterwards, the Supreme Court recalled that native languages and 
Spanish were all national languages “due to their historic origin”5, and that 
indigenous people had the right to establish their own information media in their 
languages and to have access to other media without discrimination6.  
Any interpretation of such article 230 was contrary to the Constitution 
according to the Supreme Court, because it either mandated the exclusive use of 
Spanish or it established a preference for the use of Spanish, in detriment of 
native languages. Consequently, Mardonio Carballo received the judicial 
protection so that such article 230 of the Law would not be applied to him.  
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court´s decision only benefited 
Mardonio Carballo, three months later Congress amended the law and complied 
with the arguments of the Court´s decision. It is important to note that in the 
reports of the Deputy Chamber and of the Senate, there are certain arguments 
ascertaining that the Court´s interpretation was not accurate, because Congress 
did not discriminate against indigenous languages and that the Court should 
have considered in its interpretation what other laws established (Cámara de 
Diputados, 2016; Senado de la República, 2016). Anyhow, the 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law now states on article 230: “The 
broadcasting stations may use in their transmissions any of the national 
languages pursuant to the applicable legal provisions. The indigenous 
[broadcasting stations] licenses may use the language of their native town”. 
Mardonio´s case and the decision of the Supreme Court prompted the 
action of Congress to amend the law, even if there was no mandate to do so and 
despite the fact that Congress expressed that it did not share the interpretation 
                                                          
5Article 4 of the Ley General de Derechos Lingüísticos de los Pueblos Indígenas.  
6Article 16 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 
September 13, 2007.  
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rendered by the Supreme Court. Once again, the Supreme Court opinion was the 
ship´s compass for the amendment of the law in telecommunication.  
 
Court's decision for Regulator's action  
The Specialized Courts have stated that in highly complex technical 
matters, deference to the regulator must be granted provided that the decision in 
not illogic, arbitrary or abusive, that it complies with the principles which 
govern the administrative function and due process, that the facts are correct, 
that there is no evident error in the appreciation (Poder Judicial Federal, 2015).  
“(…) the level of scrutiny is inversely related with the degree of freedom to 
decide or of the discretion that the authority has, meanwhile there are subjects 
as the economic and financial where discretion holds a great capacity to 
intervene and regulate, [and] which even if not outside the scope of control 
because it is limited by human rights and other constitutional provisions, does 
imply that judges must act without invading the authority outside their scope. 
In these cases, it is the regulator who must decide the ways to achieve the 
constitutional objectives and the type of regulatory policy, and the judges must 
control such decisions under the limits of the Constitution and the law, taking 
into account that administrative discretion implies that no authority may act 
outside the law, nor against it; that it must seek to achieve public interest and 
common welfare; its decisions must be reasonable and proportional in 
connection with the law objectives; effective; in good faith; not related with 
using public power for benefitting private interests [desvío de poder] and non-
discriminatory; provided that control upon such activity does not authorize the 
constitutional Judge to substitute in the [regulator´s] authority to decide which 
is the best regulatory policy.” (Poder Judicial Federal, 2017a) [Translation by 
author].  
Moreover, when the IFT issues norms judicial review should try to 
preserve the regulator´s decision pursuant to the Supreme Court (Suprema Corte 
de Justicia de la Nación, 2015). Consequently, one of the perceived risks is that 
so much deference to the regulator may be equivalent to denying or limiting 
justice to the regulated agents or to citizens, especially when technical issues are 
involved. The following cases evidences the approach taken by the Specialized 
Courts. 
Technical issues, the regulator’s excuse? 
The metropolitan area of Mexico City has many radio stations both in 
AM and FM. There have been requests for new radio stations, but except for a 
few ones, the authority (before Cofetel, now IFT) has denied them based on 
technical reasons.  
An association of persons -among which some argued were indigenous 
people (zapotecas)- requested in 2004 to the Ministry of Communications to 
receive the license to have a radio station in Mexico City´s metropolitan area 
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(Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl). As they did not receive a favorable response, in 2012 
they once again requested a license for a radio station this time to Cofetel with 
no success (AMEDI, 2017). In 2015 they requested the license to the IFT, and 
the IFT responded affirming that technically there was no possibility to grant the 
license for an FM radio station.  
The association filed an amparo lawsuit against the IFT´s denial of the 
license. Although the second lower Specialized Court granted the judicial 
protection so that the IFT would duly justify its decision, the first upper 
Specialized Court took a different approach considering the members of the 
association were indigenous and also because the technical reasons for denying 
the license were insufficient to prove that it was sound.  
“(…) the “technical studies and analysis performed by the General Direction 
of Spectrum Engineering and Technical Studies” which were the reason to 
deny the claimant´s request, do not say which studies were performed, under 
what methodology, nor how the conclusion of non-feasibility was arrived, or if 
applicable, of the non-availability of spectrum, and concretely, for granting a 
[license for radio] station for social-indigenous programming” (Poder Judicial 
de la Federacion, 2017c) [Translation by author]. 
The first upper Specialized Courts considered that the license for the 
radio station was requested in order to transmit content which included those 
related to the indigenous community, and that several human rights were 
involved (e.g. right to preserve and spread the language, culture and identity of 
indigenous people, freedom of expression, right to access information). Also, the 
IFT had implemented several actions for better managing spectrum and to make 
more available. Consequently, it granted the judicial protection and ordered the 
IFT to: (1) issue a new decision considering the characteristics of the license 
requested and to decide whether or not it was possible to grant the license; and 
(2) in the event that the IFT was unable to grant the license, then it must follow 
up the request and, when there was availability of spectrum for the station, then 
the IFT must immediately inform that to the association.  
Almost 5 months after the decision of the Specialized Courts the IFT 
granted the license for an FM station on 97.5 MHz (XHNEZ), under the name of 
Radio Neza (AMEDI, 2017).  
Although it is a case that involves indigenous people, whereby the courts 
are obliged to supplement any arguments in favor of them, it evidences that the 
IFT may not hold technical issues as excuses. Deference does not imply a blank 
check for the IFT to do whatever it wants.  
It is also important that the regulated entities and the citizens that 
challenge an IFT act or norm, provide enough information, facts and arguments 
against the technical aspects, otherwise the Specialized Courts may be prevented 
from incorporating them, except if the case involves children, indigenous people 
or other vulnerable groups. 
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Significant market power, yes or no 
Televisa was determined by the IFT as a preponderant agent in the 
broadcasting sector in 2014 because it holds more than 50% of national 
participation based on audience (67% of audience share) and on the MHz it has 
been licensed (54% of the MHz of free-to-air TV) (Alvarez, 2015a). Televisa 
also holds 60.6% of pay TV market (50.1% of cable TV, and 70% of satellite 
pay TV) (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones, 2017b). 
When the Telecommunication and Broadcasting Law was published in 
July 14, 2014, it set forth a transitory provision which allowed any 
telecommunication operator (except America Movil, Telcel, Telmex and Telnor 
because they are preponderant agents in telecommunications), to acquire other 
telecommunication companies or assets without having to undergo the antitrust 
prior review of a merger7. This provision is evidently contrary to the objectives 
of prior merger review in countries with free market and antitrust laws (Alvarez, 
2018).  
The provision is known as Cláusula Cablecom because it had a well-
known beneficiary: Televisa. Due to its high market share in pay TV, everytime 
Televisa acquired a cable TV before the IFT was created in 2013, the antitrust 
regulator would establish several conditions for approving the acquisition. In 
2013, Televisa publicly announced to the stock market that it had executed an 
agreement with Cablecom (a cable TV operator) which gave Televisa the option 
to acquire up to 100% of Cablecom shares. Therefore, the Cláusula Cablecom 
would enable Televisa to acquire Cablecom and any other cable TV company 
without being subject to any concentration review, nor to any condition by the 
IFT in its capacity of antitrust regulator in telecommunications and 
broadcasting. The same day that the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law 
entered into force, Televisa announced through the stock exchange that it had 
acquire 100% of Cablecom (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, 2014). 
As an illusionary measure, Congress set also another transitory provision8 
in the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law whereby it ordered the IFT to 
investigate whether there were operators with significant market power, 
specially in the pay TV market.  
The Investigation Authority within the IFT holds a fair degree of 
independence from the Plenary of IFT, and is the authority in charge of the 
investigation part (Moguel, 2015). The Investigation Authority performed the 
                                                          
7Article transitory number Ninth of the Decree whereby the Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting Law was issued, published on the Federal Official Daily on July 14, 2014.  
8Article transitory number Thirty-Ninth of the Decree whereby the Telecommunications 
and Broadcasting Law was issued, published on the Federal Official Daily on July 14, 
2014. 
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investigation ordered by Congress from September 2014 until January 2015, 
reviewing evidence from January 2009 to August 2014, concluding that Televisa 
held significant market power in pay TV in 2,124 markets along the Mexican 
Republic (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones, 2015a). When the Plenary 
of IFT reviewed the file, it decided -in a divided opinion- that there was not 
enough evidence that Televisa held market power considering data from 
September 2013 to March 2015 (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones, 
2015b).  
IFT´s decision not to recognize Televisa´s market power was widely 
criticized (Sosa, 2015). 
“In a sophist construction, to say the least, the Institute [IFT] decides –but 
does not conclude - that Televisa is not dominant in pay TV. Of the 186 pages 
of the resolution, 183 combat one by one the evidence presented by Televisa 
and even support the preliminary report [of the Investigation Authority], but, 
all of a sudden, as a magic act, in section 4 “Conclusions of the analysis”, 
without complying with any syllogism, without the minimum logical 
argumentation it “concludes” that Televisa is not dominant” (Levy, 2015) 
[Translation by author]. 
A free-to-air TV broadcaster, Televisora del Valle de México (TVM), 
filed an amparo lawsuit challenging the decision by the IFT. TVM argued that it 
had standing to pursue the amparo because if Televisa had been declared with 
significant market power, then TVM could receive royalty payments from the 
carriage of TVM signals by Televisa's pay TV companies from must-carry-
obligations. Moreover, TVM alleged several violations to its constitutional 
rights derived from IFT decision. 
The first upper Specialized Court acknowledged on January 19, 2017, 
that TVM had standing to file an amparo against IFT´s decision. Then, it 
analyzed IFT´s decision, concluding that it did not comply with reasonableness 
parameters, because IFT decided based on data which was outside the scope of 
investigation and because not even technical aspects left to regulator´s 
discretionary authority could oversee general legal principles (Poder Judicial 
Federal, 2017b). 
“Therefore, IFT Plenary's decision does not comply with the reasonableness 
parameter provided that it is based in data outside the chronological scope 
ordered by the legislator, outside the reasonable timeframe foreseen by the 
Investigation Authority, and that imply taking into account evidence which are 
part of a period after the investigation was closed, making it necessary to 
conclude that any decision, even a discretionary one in technical aspects, is not 
lawful if it infringes several general legal principles such as equality before the 
law, legal certainty, protection to legitimate trust and good faith.” (Poder 
Judicial Federal, 2017b: 165) [Translation by author].  
Consequently, the first upper Specialized Court granted the judicial 
protection to TVM and ordered the IFT to repeal its decision and to issue a new 
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one in which it must analyze the evidence collected during the investigation 
stage by IFT´s Investigation Authority. Interestingly, the Specialized Court also 
included a reference in connection with the asymmetric measures that IFT may 
eventually impose to Televisa if it had significant market power, stating that 
such measures must be “timely, reasonable, adequate and relevant at the time 
they are imposed” (Poder Judicial Federal, 2017b: 189). In other words, for 
determining whether Televisa was or was not dominant, IFT must only consider 
the investigation stage, but asymmetric measures meant to avoid abuse of such 
power must be considered at the time when they are ordered. 
IFT, on February 24, 2017, repealed its previous decision and when 
analyzing the evidence in the file decided that Televisa did hold significant 
market power pay TV markets within the Mexican Republic (Instituto Federal 
de Telecomunicaciones, 2017a). Such decision has had no real implication 
because the IFT as of February 15, 2018, has not imposed any asymmetric 
measure (Levy, 2018). However, if there would be an amparo lawsuit 
challenging IFT´s omission to impose them, the Specialized Courts will most 
likely grant the judicial protection and order IFT to implement the necessary 
measures to prevent that Televisa abuses of its market power.  
Conclusion 
Telecommunications laws and regulations are ultimately decided by the 
federal Judiciary branch in Mexico, whether through Supreme Court's 
resolutions or those from the Specialized Courts. The amendments to the 
Mexican Constitution on telecommunications, broadcast and antitrust of 2013 
represent the landmark, because of the creation of the regulator (IFT) in the 
Constitution with broad authority, and because since then the only way to 
challenge IFT´s actions or omissions is by amparo without the possibility of an 
injunction. This extreme case of only one legal remedy and no way to suspend 
the effects of IFT´s actions, is meant to overcome the long-lasting history of 
uses and abuses of administrative and judicial proceedings by regulated agents 
to delay and prevent regulatory measures to be duly and timely implemented. 
Consequently, the federal Judiciary´s role is of the essence for 
telecommunication and broadcasting, both as a market and as platforms for 
exercising human rights. 
This article described the most significant cases decided after the 
constitutional reform of 2013. There are three main aspects to highlight: (1) the 
Mexican Regulatory State is a reality now, even if it is in its beginnings; (2) 
Congress is receptive to Judiciary´s decisions; and (3) deference by judiciary is 
not a blank check to regulator. 
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The Mexican Regulatory State has revealed its principal characteristics: 
the telecommunications regulator has equal standing with the federal 
Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches; regulation by the IFT may be 
issued as long as it does not contradict the law (non-contradiction principle or 
principio de no contradicción); if the law does not address certain matter and it 
is not constitutionally reserved for the law, then the IFT has broad capacity to 
innovate and develop regulation in telecommunications and broadcast, as well as 
in antitrust for both; due to the complexity of certain matters, the regulator -and 
not Congress-, is in better position to issue norms; and regulator deserves 
deference from the judiciary, specially in technical matters.  
The interpretation, arguments and decisions by the Mexican Supreme 
Court and the Specialized Courts have guided Congress. Therefore, it is 
important that when deciding a case, the Judiciary presents and describes 
profoundly the underlying principles it is taking into account and its reasoning. 
The Judiciary has to be the lighthouse for Congress action.  
Despite an ample deference granted by the Judiciary to the IFT, technical 
decisions or those within the discretionary authority of the IFT will be 
scrutinized by the courts.  
Finally, it is important to note that for the Judiciary to take a stance, there 
must be a proceeding either (i) an amparo lawsuit by regulated agents or 
citizens, or (ii) a dispute over the scope of authority (controversia 
constitucional) or a challenge to the constitutionality of a norm (acción de 
inconstitucionalidad), both of which are filed by public entities. So, it can be 
assumed that regulated agents and public entities have the knowledge and 
resources to defend their interests before the Judiciary. But ordinary citizens and 
vulnerable groups have less chance to defend their rights; consequently, the 
regulator must be more proactive for such purpose and this which should be the 
subject-matter of a future research.  
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